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Abstract 
 
The flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is represented, i.e. that the 
passage of time is that of mere tense or belonging to the nature of the experience, it is generally accepted that the represented 
somehow tells us about the future, present and past. My contention is that this temporal character is indubitable for 
perception. I will begin by providing a temporal model of how percepts are represented. After giving a detailed presentation 
of the model, some problems will be considered, namely that the temporal model is doomed by the reversal of causal relata or 
no different than an unsuccessful perceptual experience. My contention will be that what is being represented in perception 
possesses fundamental temporal qualities that are indubitable for the experience, regardless of metaphysical worries or 
perceptual worries. If such temporal qualities belonging to the represented go without say, then a question remains as to the 
status of the temporal character of perception. After contrasting Kant’s position with Husserl’s position on the status of 
temporality in perception, I will argue that Kant’s position on perceptual temporality as manifesting from a cognitive faculty 
is more plausible. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is 
represented and experienced, i.e. that the passage of time is that of mere tense or belonging to the nature 
of the experienced, it is generally accepted that the represented somehow tells us about the future, 
present and past. My contention is that this characteristic is indubitable for perceptual experience. I will 
begin by analyzing Kant’s response to Hume in the second analogy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
and by providing a model of how percepts are organized in perception. After giving a detailed 
presentation of the model, some problems will be considered, namely that the temporal model is doomed 
by the possibility of the metaphysical reversal of causal relata or no different than an unsuccessful 
perceptual experience. My contention will be that what is being represented possesses fundamental 
temporal qualities that are indubitable for the perception, regardless of metaphysical worries or 
perceptual worries. If such temporal qualities belonging to the represented go without say, then a 
question remains as to the status of the temporal character of perception. After contrasting Kant’s 
position with Husserl’s position on the status of temporality in perception, I will argue that Kant’s 
position on perceptual temporality as manifesting from a cognitive faculty is more plausible. 
 
2. Temporality as Fundamental to Perception 
 
David Hume drew on the nature of temporality to advance his argument against causal relations. Enter 
Kant. While Kant does not totally disagree with the Hume’s worry, he will highlight something that is 
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fundamental to the phenomenological experience of causal relations in the second analogy of the 
Critique of Pure Reason: 
 
I perceive that appearances follow one another, that is, that there is a state of things at one 
time the opposite of which was in the preceding time. Thus I am really connecting two 
perceptions in time. Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is 
here the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination, which determines inner sense in 
respect of the time-relation. (Kant, 1926, p. 218 [233]) 
 
For Kant, the temporal qualities of perception are fundamental. That is, percepts are represented as about 
to happen, happening now, and having already occurred in succession. The fact that Kant states that the 
flow of experience is made possible by a “synthetic faculty of imagination,” anchors the temporal 
character of the event experience in perception.  
 
Let us imagine a case in which we are perceiving event A, followed by event B, then event C. Event A 
occurs firstly but is replaced by B and B is experienced as happening now. C follows B and A is 
represented has having occurred before B and B before C.  
 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
In figure 1, the flow of the experience is represented with an arrow. The arrow is illustrated as having 
passed through event A and B. Suppose that event A, B and C represent different temporal stages 
between causal relata. Event A could represent a cue ball on a pool table en route towards the eight ball 
(event B), which lands in the corner pocket (event C). Regardless of what else might be involved in the 
metaphysical nature of the causal event, one thing is for certain, that the event, however it occurred, will 
have to conform to our cognitive capacities for representing the event. Whether some ghostly ethereal 
force caused, along with the cue ball, to knock the eight ball into the corner pocket, the experience will 
show one event happening after another in succession. Here is the where Kant’s argument against Hume 
gains momentum. If the experiencing of the event contains the temporal characteristic of events 
happening in succession, that is, one after another, and this is indubitable for perception, then what can 
we really say about the qualities experienced in perception? We can, at the very least, say with certainty 
that the experience will be experienced in succession. 
 
2.1. Temporality and Time Reversal 
 
First, let us entertain the possibility of experiencing the abovementioned event in reverse. Instead of the 
cue ball hitting the eight ball into the corner pocket, the corner pocket spits out the eight ball hitting the 
cue ball where the hitting of the cue ball first occurs. Who is to say that all of our experiences aren’t 
subject to this conceptual worry – that all of our perceptual experiences fool us into believing that causal 
succession is represented as going forward, when the inverse is the case. Let us entertain the possibility 
of experiencing the event backwards. 
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(Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the event as experienced phenomenologically. At3 is when the eight ball is 
experienced as coming out of the corner pocket. Bt2 occurs when the eight ball makes impact with the 
cue ball. Ct1 is experienced after the cue ball has been hit by the eight ball and lands where the hit first 
occurred in the figure 1. Since we are referring to the phenomenological experiencing of At3→Bt2→Ct1 
and not the metaphysical nature of the how the causal event came about, identifying the At3→Bt2→Ct1 
experience as occurring synonymously with the temporal ordering of t1→t2→t3 doesn’t seem 
problematic. As we can see, regardless of how the event occurred metaphysically, we can still describe 
the event as occurring in succession experientially. The perceiver experiences event Ct1 as happening at 
t3 and before Bt2/t2. Bt2/t2 is experienced as occurring before At3/ t1. The metaphysical nature of the 
causal event does not effect how the event is experienced by the perceiver. If asked to give a report of 
my experiences, one event will invariably follow the other in a fundamental temporal sequence. I will 
say that At3→Bt2→Ct1 occurred synonymously with t1→t2→t3, such that At3/t1→Bt2/t2→Ct1/t3. Whether 
the metaphysical nature of the event occurred in such a way that the causal relata involved in the 
sequence was too fine-grained to make an accurate metaphysical judgment, or whether the event 
occurred in reverse – these charges brought against the fundamentality of temporality are subsumed 
under the same temporal ordering.  
 
2.2. Non-veridicality and Temporality 
 
In philosophy of perception, hallucinations and illusions are considered by many unsuccessful 
perceptual experiences. Depending on where one stands on indiscriminability, ones position about how 
perceptual experiences are epistemically justified may vary. This section operates under the assumption 
that successful and unsuccessful percepts are easily distinguishable, which may or may not be the case. 
By distinguishable, I mean that unsuccessful perceptual experiences differ by mental content. This move 
is to advance and grant the charge that the experiencing of temporal relations in perception are no 
different than non-veridical cases in perception. 
 
A possible threat to the fundamentality of temportality in perception is the charge that the experience 
itself may be illusory. The charge that it is possible for the experiencing of temporality in perception to 
be no different than misrepresenting of an object in perception still doesn’t threaten the fundamentality 
of temporality, even in a phenomenon as seemingly threatening as Akinetopsia where: 
 
… sufferers lose the ability to see movement whilst retaining the ability to see other 
properties, such as color, form, and orientation … When filling the teacup sufferers see 
the liquid level jump from level to level rather than rise gently. Probably the closest 
experience for normal perceivers would be the experience of seeing moving objects under 
strobe lighting. However, such a parallel should not be taken too literally. (Fish, 2010, p. 
129) 
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Imagine the experiencing of the cue ball hitting the eight ball into the corner pocket through the lens of 
Akinetopsia. Obviously the judgment that the event occurred drastically with no movement between the 
hitting of the eight ball and the cue ball is incorrect. There was a definite distance the cue ball needed to 
travel to get to the eight ball, whether our perceiver noticed it or not does not change matters of fact. 
One thing we cannot question is the order in which the experiences came about. Again, one event 
invariably followed another in experience, whether it occurred under Akinetopsia or in a dark room with 
a strobe light is arbitrary. Non-veridical percepts still do not threaten the temporal structure of how we 
represent events. Even if our present experiences filter facts that are essential for understanding the 
metaphysical underpinnings of reality, the fact that perception is organized temporally doesn’t change. 
 
3. Temporality as a Cognitive Mechanism or a Feature of How Perception Represents? 
 
Now that we have shown temporality to be a fundamental characteristic of perception, there is a deep 
question regarding the status of temporal representation. Is it a cognitive mechanism that governs our 
experiences or simply a representation itself? We have already established the indubitable character of 
temporal sequencing in perception, but how does this experience come about? In Husserl’s On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, he stresses the fundamentality of flow in 
experience, but a difficulty arises as to the status of this fundamental flow: 
 
But then the following difficulty arises. I surely do know of the flow of consciousness as 
flow. I can look at it … it forms, so it seems, a unity in memory. Does not the flow of 
consciousness therefore also become constituted in consciousness as a unity? ... And 
must we then not also go on to say that this unity becomes constituted in an altogether 
analogous way and is every bit as much a constituted temporal series, and that one must 
therefore surely speak of a temporal now, before and after? (Husserl, p. 391, [380]) 
 
In other words, if I am aware of this temporal sequence in consciousness, doesn’t the recognizing of a 
temporal sequence also satisfy the requirements for that constitute membership as a constituent of the 
temporal series? When experiencing and giving a report of t1→t2→t3, isn’t the acknowledging of this 
temporal series as unified in my qualitative experience of the event just as fundamental as the flow, 
which my experiences are committed to? It seems as though this issue presses the on the ontological 
status of my experiencing t1→t2→t3. If Husserl is willing to concede that consciousness of internal time 
has features indicative of a representation, however he decides to carve it out, then it seems that his 
treatment of the issue is doomed to infinite regress. The closest Husserl ever gets to admitting that the 
perception of a temporal sequence (what he calls the “temporal act”) is itself a representation is in his 
discussion of his teacher Brentano: 
 
Behind his discussion of Brentano and Meinong is Husserl’s contention that the 
perception of a temporal object “is itself a temporal object and as such has its phases” 
(235). A melody, for example runs off phase by phase, but so does the act that intends it. 
(Husserl, 1980, p. XXXIII) 
 
If my consciousness of the time sequence t1→t2→t3 itself becomes some kind of a representation (a 
temporal object), which Husserl doesn’t deny, then my percept can itself become a constituent in 
experience T1, where T1 means to be conscious of t1→t2→t3. If I am conscious of T1 as a temporal 
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object, then consciousness of T1 is not exempt from being considered yet another temporal object T2 – 
infinite regress. 
 
For Kant, subsuming events under a temporal order is characteristic of a cognitive mechanism. For Kant 
there are various cognitive faculties but he ascribes the awareness of temporality in perception as 
manifesting from a synthetic faculty of imagination. Wilfrid Sellars describes this faculty as being that 
of a constructive sort: “perceptual consciousness involves the constructing of sense-image models of 
external objects. This construction is the work of the imagination responding to the stimulation of the 
retina” (Sellars, 1978). 
 
If Kant is correct and the fundamental temporal character of perceptual experience is governed and 
constructed by our cognitive faculties, then it seems that the fundamentality of temporality faces no 
threat of infinite regress. The threat of infinite regress only comes about when we regard temporality in 
perception as being merely a representation. But if we anchor our perception of temporality in a 
cognitive faculty, then it is more plausible to imagine the experience of time as being a construction – a 
mechanism that filters experience as happening in a determined temporal order that is indubitable for 
perception. Our minds are simply the conduit through which experiences enter and are organized by the 
faculties already present in cognition. This seems to be more plausible route than Husserl’s solution. 
Kant states: 
 
All empirical knowledge involves the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination. This 
synthesis is always successive, that is, the representations in it are always sequent upon 
one another … But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of a 
given appearance, the order is determined in the object, or, so to speak more correctly, is 
an order of successive synthesis that determines the object. (Kant, 1926, p. 226 [A 201]) 
 
The mind subsumes events in reality under a temporal order that reflects how the subject exists in 
relation to what is being perceived. As Kant notes, this synthesis is “always successive,” which means 
that regardless of how metaphysically complex the causal relationship may be between the cue ball and 
the eight ball, the perception of succession still stands. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Time is indispensable for perception. The abovementioned charges brought against the fundamentality 
of perception fall short in that they don’t directly threaten the perceiving of time sequences. The 
metaphysical nature of causation, and how one ought to go about conceiving of causal relata do not 
threaten temporal representation in perception, because even in the most outlandish cases, where we 
entertained the possibility of time sequences occurring in reverse the sequence can still be described in 
the time sequence At3→Bt2→Ct1. There is still succession. As noted previously, even if some ghostly 
force where involved in the eight ball coming out of the corner pocket, the experience shows one event 
occurring invariably after another. Another worry was that maybe the experiencing of causal sequences 
temporally are no different than a flawed perceptual experience. Aside from the fact that there is no way 
of telling how temporal representation could be deemed as unsuccessful, even in cases where the 
perceiver is suffering from a disorder like Akinetopsia, there is still a temporal order, regardless of what 
or what isn’t seen in between. Finally, after contrasting Husserl’s concerns about the status of the 
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fundamental temporal flow with Kant’s position, a stronger position would be to claim that the 
perceiving of time sequences is a product of a cognitive mechanism. There is no reason to believe that 
the indubitable nature of temporality in perception doesn’t involve some sort of representing that 
emerges out of our cognitive capacities. The problem of infinite regress only arises when we ascribe our 
perceiving of time the characteristics of a mere representation. 
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